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4 edition of An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multi-attribute RFQ process found in the catalog.

An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multi-attribute RFQ process

by Lawrence M. Wein

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  • 2 Currently reading

Published by Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology] in [Cambridge, Mass .
Written in English


About the Edition

We consider a manufacturer who uses a reverse, or procurement, auction to determine which supplier will be awarded a contract. Each bid consists of a price and a set of non price attributes (e.g., quality, lead time). The manufacturer is assumed to know the parametric form of the suppliers" cost functions (in terms of the non price attributes), but has no prior information on the parameter values. We construct a multi round open ascending auction mechanism, where the manufacturer announces a slightly different scoring rule (i.e., a function that ranks the bids in terms of the price and non price attributes) in each round. Via inverse optimization, the manufacturer uses the bids from the first several rounds to learn the suppliers" cost functions, and then in the final round chooses a scoring rule that attempts to maximize his own utility. Under the assumption that suppliers submit their myopic best response bids in the last round, and do not distort their bids in the earlier rounds (i.e., they choose their minimum cost bid to achieve any given score), our mechanism indeed maximizes the manufacturer"s utility within the open ascending format. We also discuss several enhancements that improve the robustness of our mechanism with respect to the model"s informational and behavioral assumptions. Keywords: multi-attribute auction, inverse optimization.

Edition Notes

StatementLawrence M. Wein [and] Damian R. Beil.
SeriesWorking paper -- 4226-01, Working paper (Sloan School of Management) -- 4226.
ContributionsBeil, Damian., Sloan School of Management.
The Physical Object
Paginationleaves :
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17936520M
OCLC/WorldCa50855764

istics and the nature of the contract. The question is, how a market mechanism can provide support for the utilization of integrative gains and, simultaneously, keep search costs as low as possible. To this end, the paper outlines the working of a centralized multi-attribute continuous-time double auction mechanism. 1 Introduction. "An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multiattribute RFQ Process," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(11), pages , November. Fernando Branco, " The Design of Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages , Spring.

The design of multidimensional auctions. RAND Journal of Economics () pp. 63– 3. Beil, D. R. and Wein, L.: An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process. Management Science () pp. – 4. Parkes, D. and Kalagnanam, J.: Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions. An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multi-Attribute Rfq Process. MIT Sloan Working Paper No. Number of pages: 59 Posted: 31 Dec Lawrence M. Wein and Damian R. Beil. Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stephen M. Ross School of Business.

An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multi-Attribute Rfq Process it is becoming even more necessary that workable social programmes are shown to be worthy of support. This book presents one approach to evaluation -- multiattribute utility technology -- which stresses that evaluations should be comparative, and that. An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multi-Attribute Rfq Process. MIT Sloan Working Paper No. Number of pages: 59 Posted: 31 Dec Lawrence M. Wein and Damian R. Beil Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stephen M. Ross School of Business.


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An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multi-attribute RFQ process by Lawrence M. Wein Download PDF EPUB FB2

An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism To Support a Multi-Attribute RFQ Process. For more information, [email protected] or please visit our website at or contact the Center directly at A research and education initiative at the MIT Sloan School of Management.

Buy An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multi-Attribute Rfq Process (Classic Reprint) on FREE SHIPPING on qualified orders An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multi-Attribute Rfq Process (Classic Reprint): Wein, Lawrence M.: : BooksCited by: We construct a multiround open-ascending auction mechanism, where the manufacturer announces a slightly different scoring rule (i.e., a function that ranks the bids in terms of the price and nonprice attributes) in each round.

Via inverse optimization, the manufacturer uses the bids from the first several rounds to learn the suppliers' cost functions, and then in the final round chooses a scoring rule that attempts to maximize Cited by: Download Citation | An Inverse-Optimization-based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multi-Attribute RFQ Process | Title from cover.

"December " | Find, read and cite all the research you need on. An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multi-attribute RFQ process.

by Lawrence M Wein,Sloan School of Management,Damian Beil. Share your thoughts Complete your review. Tell readers what you thought by rating and reviewing this book.

Rate it * You Rated it *. thecompany'smulti-attributeprocurementsoftware(wearenotatlibertytodiscussits details) and theperceivedneeds and preferencesof their customers (i.e., the manufacturers whoown their software) and thesupplier companies (i.e., thepotentialbidders) with respect.

Beil and Wein designed a multi-round open-ascending auction mechanism for multi-attribute auctions. In their study, an inverse-optimization-based approach was given to. TO SUPPORT A MULTI-ATTRIBUTE RFQ PROCESS. By and Lawrence M. WeinDamian R. Beil, An Inverse-optimization-based, Auction Mechanism, Daniian R.

Beil and Lawrence M. Wein. Abstract. This paper also can be downloaded without charge from th Year: OAI identifier. Beil DR, Wein LM () An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multi-attribute RFQ process.

Manag Sci 49(11)– CrossRef Google Scholar 2. An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multi-attribute RFQ process.

By Lawrence M. Wein and Damian Beil. Abstract. Title from cover."December Publisher: [Cambridge, Mass.: Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of. Downloadable. We consider a manufacturer who uses a reverse, or procurement, auction to determine which supplier will be awarded a contract.

Each bid consists of a price and a set of nonprice attributes (e.g., quality, lead time). The manufacturer is assumed to know the parametric form of the suppliers' cost functions (in terms of the nonprice attributes), but has no prior information on the.

CiteSeerX — An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multiattribute RFQ Process CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): We consider a manufacturer who uses a reverse, or procurement, auction to determinewhich supplier. AN INVERSE-OPTIMIZATION-BASED AUCTION MECHANISM TO SUPPORT A MULTI-ATTRIBUTE RFQ PROCESS Damian R.

Beil and Lawrence M. Wein. CiteSeerX — An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): We consider a manufacturer who uses a reverse, or procurement, auction.

Excerpt from An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multi-Attribute Rfq Process To engage bidders in a multi - attribute auction, an auctioneer needs to provide the bidders with some information pertaining to how he values the non-price attributes.

While several rather obtuse approaches are possible the auctioneer could provide shadow prices from a mathematical program without revealing the mathematical program Author: Lawrence M.

Wein. 2. Basic theory of multi-attribute reverse auction The connotation of multi-attribute reverse auction The so-called reverse auction is opposite to daily said auction, namely, it is an on-line bidding mechanism, in which a buyer and many sellers are involved.

Multi-attribute auctions are central to B2B markets, enterprise procurement activity and negotiation in multi-agent system. A novel iterative multi-attribute auction mechanism for reverse auction settings with one buyer and many sellers is proposed based on competitive equilibrium.

An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multi-attribute RFQ process. Center for eBusiness at MIT, Working Paper #December Google Scholar. We consider a manufacturer using a request-for-quotes (RFQ) reverse auction in combination with supplier qualification screening to determine which qualified supplier will be awarded a contract.

Supplier qualification screening is costly for the manufacturerfor example, involving reference checks, financial audits, and on-site visits. The manufacturer seeks to minimize its total procurement. An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute rfq process.

Management Science, 49(11), – Crossref, ISI, Google Scholar; Budde, M and S Minner (). First-and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts. European Journal of Operational Research, (1), –. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to understand the mechanism design of a multi‐attribute scoring auction with endogenous supply risk.

We further analyze the impacts of additive uncertainty on bidding behaviors and auction design. 3 Base Model Model Description. The basic setting of our model can be described as follows.In new product development, the asymmetric information between the firms and developers is inherent.

It always leads to failure for choosing the developers. If a firm selects the wrong developer with shortcomings in the team, technology, market, etc, then it will lead to the deviation from the expected results in the development of new product in terms of performance, cost and schedule, and.The presented research compares two types of mechanisms: multi-attribute reverse auctions and multi-attribute multi-bilateral negotiations in e-procurement.

Both laboratory and online experiments were carried out to examine their effects on the process, outcomes, and suppliers’ assessment.